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  1ABSTRACT 
Many studies show that individuals from ethnic minority groups receive low levels 
of job-related training, raising the question of whether lower expected wage benefits 
contribute to this lack of training.  In this paper, unit record data are used to examine the 
effect of job-related training on wages in New Zealand.  The results suggest that both the 
receipt of employer-provided training, and the number of training events, have larger effects 
on wages for minority workers than they do for white workers.  There are no differences 
across ethnic groups in the wage benefits from other types of training. 
JEL: J15, J31 
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2 1 INTRODUCTION 
ployers’ beliefs about 
 training non-white employees or because of some discrimination on the 
art of employers.  
inorities 
might be that they expect smaller wage benefits.  Because wages should reflect productivity, 
smaller wage benefits might also indicate lower returns to employers, making it less likely 
that non-whites receive training offers.
3  But few of the econometric studies of training and 
wages follow the lead of Flanagan (1974) in estimating separate wage equations to allow 
training effects to vary between whites and non-whites.
4  This is surprising because some of 
these studies find unexpectedly higher wage benefits of training for non-whites, making it 
harder to understand why minority workers have a lower likelihood of being trained.  For 
example, Flanagan (1974) finds that the mean level of training for young black workers is less 
than one-half that of white workers, but training raises the wages of black workers by 13 
percent compared to only 7 percent for white workers.  Lynch (1992) reports similar evidence 
of relatively high wage benefits from comparatively low levels of training for non-whites. 
                                                
A common finding in studies of job-related training is that individuals from non-
white ethnic minority groups have a lower likelihood of being trained.
2  Because training may 
improve earnings, occupational status and job security Blundell et al., (1999) this lack of 
training could contribute to permanent labour market disadvantages for these ethnic groups.  
However, less is known about the causes of these ethnic gaps in the incidence of training.  For 
example, Shields and Wheatley Price (1999) suggest that gaps may arise because of the 
poorer response by non-whites to training opportunities, because of em
the low returns from
p
One possible cause of poor response to training opportunities by ethnic m
 
2 Examples from the U.S. include Duncan and Hoffman (1979), Blakemore and Low (1983), and Lynch (1992), 
while from the U.K. they include Greenhalgh and Stewart (1987), Arulampalam and Booth (1997), and Shields 
and Wheatley Price (1999). In Australia, immigrant workers from a non-English-speaking background have 
significantly lower probabilities of receiving training (VandenHeuvel and Wooden, 1997). Studies that find no 
evidence of ethnic differences in the incidence of training include Booth (1991), Veum (1995), and Veum 
(1996). The only studies to find significantly higher training probabilities for non-whites are Altonji and Spletzer 
(1991) and Booth (1993).  
3 In this paper benefits are distinguished from returns. Returns require some consideration of the cost of training, 
whereas benefits do not. In the empirical section, attention is restricted to the wage benefits of training because 
no information is available on costs. 
4 This approach is limited to Duncan and Hoffman (1979), Blakemore and Low (1983), Lynch (1992) and 
Sexton and Olsen (1994). 
  3Other studies also show that workers with low social and economic status have high 
returns from
aining disadvantaged groups (given that training 
would not be observed if benefits did not exceed costs). 
 III 
discusses the model specification and econometric methods.  Wage equations with and 
without corrections for endogenous selection are reported in Section IV, while Section V 
 training but low participation in it, although there is debate about the policy 
implications of this pattern Blundell et al (1999).  One view is that there is socially-inefficient 
rationing of training, so policies driven by equity considerations – such as extending training 
to groups with low participation rates – might also be efficient because of the high wage 
returns for these groups OECD (1999).  This is in contrast to the comparative advantage view, 
where endogenous selection means that those who do not receive training are those for whom 
the returns are lowest Groot et al (1994), so that extending training to new groups may come 
at the cost of efficiency.  Under the comparative advantage view, the reported high wage 
benefits may just reflect the high costs of tr
In light of these debates, this paper re-examines the question of whether non-white 
workers have greater wage gains from job-related training than do white workers.   
Confidential unit record data from the New Zealand Education and Training Survey (ETS) are 
used to estimate separate wage equations for ethnic groups.  New Zealand is a setting where 
ethnic minorities have significantly poorer labour market outcomes Te Puni Kokiri (1998), 
which are mirrored in their lower participation in job-related training Gobbi (1998).  In response 
to these disparities, the New Zealand Government has embarked upon a programme of “closing 
the gaps”.  Hence, it may be useful to test for ethnic differences in the wage effects of training, 
and if such differences are found, to analyse whether they reflect rationing or comparative 
advantage. 
The next section describes the features of the survey that is used, while Section
concludes. 
2  THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SURVEY 
The Education and Training Survey (ETS) was a one-off survey conducted by 
Statistics New Zealand as a supplement to the September 1996 Household Labour Force 
Survey (HLFS).  It is the first major survey of job-related training in New Zealand.  The 
survey asked respondents aged 15-64 about their participation in training provided either by 
  4an employer or externally (denoted in-house and external)
5, and in study towards a 
qualification during the previous year.  Although international comparisons show New 
Zealand to have a high participation rate in job-related training OECD (1999), the 
disaggregated data from the ETS reveal considerable disparities between ethnic groups.  For 
example, the incidence of external and in-house training for people of Pacific Islands origin is 
approximately half that of whites, with significant gaps also for people of Maori origin and 
other minority groups (Table 1).  
Table 1: Participation rates in0 In-house and external training 
  White  Maori  Pacific Island  Other minority 
In-house training  24.4%  17.8%  13.7%  21.4% 
External training  14.5%  10.1%  4.4%  9.7% 
Source: Gobbi (1998). 
The distinction between in-house and external training made by the survey may be 
a useful feature in terms of the debate about the rationing of training.
6  For in-house training 
to go ahead, it must be beneficial for both the worker and the firm Oosterbeek (1998), 
whereas external training may just reflect the demands of the worker.  Hence, differences in 
the incidence of the two types of training may support inferences about the supply curve for 
employer-provided training.  The potential supply-side rationing of in-house training is also 
consistent with the finding that employer-provided training has higher returns than off-the-job 
training from other sources Blundell et al (1999). 
A drawback of the survey is that no distinction is made between completed and on-
going trai
rkers do in fact pay for general training provided by employers Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1999), so this drawback of the data may not be too severe.  Moreover, most in-house 
                                                
ning.  Current in-house training may have a negative wage effect if workers pay for 
general training (and their share of specific training – see Hashimoto (1981) in the form of 




the needs of 
tions used by the ETS are that in-house training is that organized by an employer primarily to meet 
its own employees, is conducted in-house or externally, and is delivered by the company’s own 
employees or external training providers. External training covers all other employment-related training for the 
employed and unemployed. 
6 A further advantage of the ETS, for the purposes of measuring the wage effects of training, is that it is based on 
the general population, whereas many other studies are based just on youth cohorts (Lynch, 1992; Booth, 1993; 
Veum, 1995). 
  5training appears to be of short duration,
7 so there may not be significant costs for firms to 
recoup in the form of lower wages.  The survey also does not distinguish between training 
received at the current and previous employers, so the issue of portability of training across 
jobs is not able to be investigated.  There is conflicting evidence about whether on-the-job 
training is portable from employer to employer Lynch (1992); Blundell et al.(1999) and the 
degree of portability may also vary across ethnic groups Sexton and Olsen (1994). 
3 METHODS 
.1  Specification and Estimation Method 
cification  on the f g log wag on: 
j
m
j j w + θ β ln       ( 1 )  
3
The spe  is based ollowin e equati






j x  is a vector of personal and job characteristics that affect wages of the jth 
worker in  ethnic group m (m=1,2), and 
m
j d  is some measure of training.  Our interest is in 
testing the hypothesis 
white non white − =θ θ for each measure of in-house and external training 
considered. Both the incidence of training and the number of training episodes in the previous 
12 months are considered.  Veum (1995) notes that training effects may be more apparent 
with incidence data, which will have less measurement error if it is easier for respondents to 
remember whether they received training rather than how many times or how many days they 
were trained.  
However, there may be a problem in testing the hypothesis that 
white non white − =θ θ because equation (1) may give inconsistent parameter estimates if selection 
of workers into training is non-random.  Specifically, if training is allocated according to the 
selection equation (dropping superscripts): 
( ) ( ) 0 prob 1 Prob > + = = j j j e d γ z     (2) 
where z is a vector of explanatory variables determining training receipt, and 
         
j
                                         
uite short in duration. 
7 According to Statistics New Zealand (1997), for almost 90 percent of the workers receiving in-house training, 
the longest training episode lasted less than one week. Veum (1995) also finds that many company training 
programs are q
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then dj will be correlated with uj, resulting in inconsistent estimates.  For example, 
if workers participating in training are more ambitious, and if that (unobservable) ambition 
also gets rewarded with higher wages, then the correlation between the errors in the 
rrelation between the training variable and the 
). 
eter inconsistency is to add the 
Mills ratio
participation and wage equations forces a co
wage equation errors Booth (1993
One common solution to this problem of param
 from a probit model of training receipt, 
) (  
  7
(3) 
to the wage equation Lynch (1992).  In this framework, the β ˆ  should be unbiased estimates 
once mj is included in the wage equation, and the statistical significance of the coefficient on 
this added variable,  , ρσ λ =  provides a test of endogenous selection bias.  However, the main 
practical problem with this procedure is that the same set of explanatory variables are likely to 
affect both the training receipt and the earnings equations, so one is forced to either make 









f the selectivity-corrected training impact Lynch (1992); Booth (1993). It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that m
estimates of λ and little im
n of the earnings functions is that the ETS data on 
earnings are not continuous.  Instead, they fall into five unequal
$14,001-$22,000; $22,001-$29,000; $29,001-$39,000 and >$39,000).
8
used, OLS estimation of an equation with interval data as the dependent variable 
(implemented, for example, by using the mid-points of the intervals) is generally inconsistent 
any studies of training find statistically insignificant 
pact of adding the Mills ratios to the earnings equations. 
3.2 Dependent  Variable 
One factor complicating estimatio
 intervals (<$14,000; 
  Despite being widely 
                                                 
8 The questionnaire allowed respondents to answer in weekly, fortnightly, monthly or annual terms but all data 
were converted to annual equivalents during the processing of the survey. Steward (1983).  Instead, a consistent maximum likelihood procedure, which is a 
generalisation of the Tobit model, is used here StataCorp (1997).  This model requires the 
end-points of the intervals to be specified (with the exception of the lower end-point for the 
bottom in
3.3 
The vector   includes a fairly standard set of worker characteristics that have 
been used as control variables in previous studies of the wage effects of training.  However, 
the set of variables is less extensive than many studies because of the cross-sectional nature
evious 12 
months) may preclude workers from gaining enough training to change occupations. 
consistent with previous studies Blakemore and Low 
(1980); B
within ethnic groups, and no difference across men and women in the returns to education 
terval and the upper end-point for the top interval, which are censored).  The interval 
regression model assumes that the distribution of the error term is normal (which is consistent 
with the two-step approach of adding the Mills ratio) and the estimation method also takes 
account of the sampling weights and uses heteroscedastically-robust variance-covariance 
estimators. 




the survey and its focus on the individual rather than on their workplace.  Thus, in addition to 
variables measuring the amount of time that the worker spent accumulating schooling, general 
labour market experience and tenure at the current employer, the survey also provides 
variables describing the gender, marital status, occupation and industry of the worker.  
Amongst these control variables, three deserve comment.  The tenure variable may 
reflect informal training not included in the training measures, in addition to any effect it has 
in capturing the wage effects of job seniority.  The use of control variables for occupation 
allows training effects to be interpreted as the wage-change within occupations; this seems 
appropriate because the short period over which training is recorded (that is, the pr
Including controls for occupation is also 
ooth (1991); Veum (1995), many of which also include industry dummies, although 
as Lynch (1992) points out, adding industry and occupation effects appears to have only a 
slight effect on the coefficients for training variables.  The third feature of the control 
variables is that gender is just treated as an intercept effect.  Previous analyses with the ETS 
data show no significant differences in the incidence of training between men and women 
Gibson (2000).  Moreover, the gender composition is constant across ethnic groups so any 
  8differential effects of training on men’s and women’s wages should not affect the comparison 
of interest, which is across ethnic groups. 
Although the ETS has a sample of 22,257, a total of 10,443 respondents were either 
not employed or else had missing information on earnings and so were excluded from the 
analysis.
9  Part-time workers (n=2969) are excluded from the analysis because it is difficult to 
know from the annual earnings variable whether these workers have low wages or low labour 
supply.
10  Also excluded were 616 workers with missing information on either training, tenure 
or years of schooling, leaving a final estimating sample of 8229.  Although whites dominate 
me from minority groups, particularly indigenous 
Maori (n=782) and workers of Pacific Islands origin (n=397), while all other ethnic minorities 
comprise  ur
proportion
(n=6746), almost one-fifth of the sample co
just under fo  percent of the sample (n=304). Because all three of these minority 
groups have a low incidence of training, they are combined into one group for the wage 
equations to overcome any problems of small sample size. 
Descriptive statistics for this sample are reported in Table 2 and these show that the 
lower level of training for the non-white workers has been preserved by the sample selection 
rules.  The average incidence and number of episodes of in-house training for non-white 
workers is only three-quarters as high as for whites, while for external training the 
ate gap is slightly larger.  The lower schooling, labour market experience and 
tenure of non-white workers is also apparent.  The distributional data on the earnings intervals 
also shows the poorer labour market position of non-whites, with only one-sixth having 
earnings in the top bracket (>$39,001) compared with almost one-third of white workers 
being in this earnings bracket.  
                                                 
9 These exclusions are unlikely to cause any sample selectivity bias because an earnings function fitted to these 
data gives results that are very similar to previously published results from the 1996 Census of Population 
(Gibson, 2000). 
10 Booth (1991) also excludes part-time workers when using bracketed annual earnings data to estimate the effect 
of training on wages. 
  9Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the sample 
 White    Non-White 
  Mean  Std. Dev    Mean  Std. Dev 
Male 0.601  (0.490)    0.608  (0.488) 
Married 
0.657 (0.475)    0.671  (0.470) 
Years of experience 
18.966 (12.013)    16.931  (10.499) 
Tenure (months)   62.985  (50.106)    52.959  (46.758) 
Post-primary school years  6.081  (2.823)    5.255  (2.976) 
 In-house  training          
Received training last year?  0.312 (0.463)    0.231  (0.422) 
Number of training episodes  0.678  (1.238)    0.514  (1.128) 
 External  training          
Received training last year?  0.167 (0.373)    0.095  (0.293) 
Number of training episodes  0.304  (0.822)    0.203  (0.765) 
Annual (pre-tax) earnings interval 
 
Under $14,000  0.044     0.061  
$14,001 to $22,000  0.161     0.287  
$22,001 to $29,000  0.229     0.279  
$29,001 to $39,000  0.263     0.210  
$39,001 and over  0.303     0.164  
Sample Size  6746  1483 
Note: Estimates use population sampling weights. 
4 RESULTS 
The maximum likelihood results of the log earnings equations, without corrections 
for endogenous selection into training, are presented in Table 3.  The first columns, presenting 
results when training is measured by incidence, suggest that white workers who received in-
house training in the previous year, have wage gains of almost nine percent, while for non-
white workers the wage gains are 16 percent.  These wage gains for white workers are within 
the range found in other studies e.g. Blundell et al. (1999) suggest an approximate wage effect 
any studies, although similar in magnitude to the results of Flanagan (1974).  
significant for non-whites.  Hypothesis test results at the bottom of Table 3 show that the 
of five percent).  The wage effects for non-white workers are somewhat higher than the 
estimates of m
The wage effects of external training are rather lower for both groups and are not statistically 
  10difference in wage effects across ethnic groups is statistically significant for in-house training 
p< 0.02), but not for external training (p<0
3:   Effect of In-house and external training on log annual earnings by
group
a




Table   ethnic 
dence  Trai easured by umber of 
 White  No White  N   n-white    on-white 
     β    |t|   β  |t|  β  |t|   β  |t| 
Male (=1)  0.235 (19.7)  0.225 (19.8)  0.225 (10.2)    (10.3)  0.236  
Married (=1)  0.072 (5.97)    0.041 (6.11)  0.048 (1.94)  (1.64)  0.073  
Years of experience 0.014 (3.72)  (13.4)    0.014 (3.80) 
b 0.023 (13.2)    0.023
(Years of experience)
2 -0.047 (12.5)  -0.047 (12.8)  -0.027 (3.37)    -0.026 (3.27)   
Tenure (months)  0.002 (14.2)  0.002 (14.2)  0.002 (6.89)    (6.99)  0.002  
School years
c 0.043 (16.8)    0.030 (16.9)  0.030 (6.10)  (6.15)  0.043  
In-house training   0.082 (7.03)  0.151 (6.71)  0.051    (5.82)  0.029   (5.10) 
External training   0.069 (4.51)  0.042 (4.00)  0.029    (0.95)  0.032   (1.68) 
Intercept 9.770 (136)  9.772 (331)    9.784  (141)  (331)    9.788
                    
σ  0.325 (63.5) 0.317 (33.6)  .326 (63.4)  0.317 (33.3)      0
Wald test (slopes = 0)  χ
2
(16) = 2969.9 χ
2
) = 546.1  (16) = 2931. χ (16) = 530.3      (16 χ
2 8    2
  H0: θ 
non-white
white = θ 






External training  t=0.58 (p< t=0.17 (p   0.57)  <0.87)
 
Note: Estimates weighted by population sampling weights and t-statistics based on heteroscedastically-consistent 
standard errors.  The sample size is N=6746 in the white sample and N=1483 in the non-white sample.  Each 
l dummy variables.  
 interval form. 
b This is potential labour market experience calculated as age minus post-primary school years minus 12. 
c Equivalent
equation also contains eight occupationa
a Earnings are pre-tax and are reported in
 full-time years of secondary school and post-secondary school educational study. 
These higher wage benefits of in-house training for non-whites contrast with the 
rather lower returns earned from other human capital characteristics; the coefficients on years 
of schooling and the experience quadratic for non-whites are significantly lower than for 
whites (at the p<0.04 level).  Thus, while wages for full-time white workers peak after 24 
years of potential labour market experience at 32 percent higher than for a worker without 
experience, non-whites gain only a 20 percent wage premium at peak experience.  Similarly, 
the (Mincerian) return to post-primary schooling for non-whites is only three-quarters of that 
for whites, at three percent per completed year.  However, the wage premia for being male (26 
percent), for being married (seven percent) and for tenure (approximately two percent per 
year with the firm) do not vary with ethnicity.  
  11When training is measured by the number of episodes, the results in the last 
columns of Table 3 are largely the same.  The wage gains from in-house training for non-
ethnic groups in the effects of external training.  In contrast to Veum’s (1995) point about 
easurement error, no att aining ng 
way from the incidence mea  with the xternal   for on fact 
ecoming statistically sign an  the <0.10 level.  Results not reported in Table 3 also 
 the larger wage  hi house
 exclusion of i c ; if odel, the test of  
t θ i ds  of 2.11 ( ) w  is 
e number of
he results for th e at  only e he ted 
ers who receive training (Table 4).  Adding 
s ratios from separately estima d  tions  ip  o and 
xternal training changes  vera  of the co ficients in the model, but does not have much 
ect on the coefficients o g ar nsequ st ated wage gains 
twice fo  w 2) 
while there appears to be no difference across ethnic groups in the wage effects of external 
whites are still almost twice as high as for whites (p<0.05) while there is no difference across 
m enuation of the measured tr  effect is evident when movi
a sures,    effect of e training  n -whites in 
b ific t at  p
show that gains for non-w tes from in-  training are not affected by the 
inclusion or ndustry effe ts  these effects are added to the m
the hypothesis tha
white non white − =θ y el  a t-statistic p<0.04   hen training
measured by th  episodes. 
T e earnings  qu ions change  slightly onc  t y are correc
for the potentially endogenous selection of work
the Mill te probit equa for the rece t f in-house 
e se l   ef
eff n the trainin  v iables.
11  Co ently, the e im
from in-house training for non-whites are still almost   as high as  r hites (p<0.0
training.
                                                 
11 This procedure ignores any correlation in the errors of the probit equations for in-house and external training, 
which should not be too serious because a bivariate probit gave correlations of only –0.12 for whites and –0.04 
for non-whites (standard errors of 0.08 and 0.03). Lynch (1992) also ignored correlations in probit errors of –
0.12 and estimated separate equations. An alternative approach used by Veum (1995) is to generate the 
selectivity terms from a multinomial logit, where the choices are no training, in-house training or external 
training. But this approach requires mutually exclusive categories and in the current sample 11 percent of those 
receiving training received it in both in-house and external forms. 
  12Table 4:  Selectivity-corrected estimates of log annual earnings functions 
  Training Measured by Incidence  Training Measured by Number of 
Episodes
 
 White    Non-white  White    Non-white 
     β    |t|   β  |t|  β  |t|   β  |t| 
Male (=1)  0.172 (5.83)    0.206 (1.39)  0.176 (5.89)    0.196 (1.32) 
Married (=1)  0.173 (3.09)    0.136 (0.43)  0.171 (3.02)    0.197 (0.63) 
Years of experience
b 0.045 (3.16)    0.010 (0.92)  0.045 (3.08)    0.008 (0.74) 
(Years of experience)
2 -0.108 (2.83)    -0.020 (0.48)  -0.106 (2.75)    -0.017 (0.40) 
Tenure (months)  -0.003 (2.18)    0.003 (0.93)  -0.003 (2.09)    0.003 (1.08) 
School years
c 0.167 (3.76)    0.026 (0.40)  0.164 (3.63)    0.024 (0.37) 
In-house training       0.150 (5.81)  0.029 (6.79)    0.051 (5.06)  0.083 (7.13)
External training   0.068 (4.43)    0.042 (0.94)  0.031 (3.86)    0.029 (1.66) 
λ1 (in-house probit)  1.331 (2.93)    -0.279 (0.33) 1.316 (2.88)    -0.444 (0.52) 
λ2 (external probit)  -3.135  (3.37)    0.197 (0.12) -3.057 (3.24)    0.301 (0.19) 
Intercept  6.359 (4.52)    9.734 (3.55)  6.475 (4.54)    9.680 (3.52) 
                    
σ  0.325 (63.1)    0.317 (33.6) 0.325 (63.0)    0.317 (33.3) 
Wald test (slopes = 0)  χ
2
(18) = 2994.2    χ
2
(18) = 555.6  χ
2
(18) = 2960.9    χ
2
(18) = 538.4 
  H0: θ 








External training  t=0.55 (p<0.59)  t=0.12 (p<0.91) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of endogenous selection into training programmes 
because there is no clear pattern amongst the coefficients on the Mills ratios.  The errors in the 
wage equation for white workers appear to be positively correlated with the unobservables in 
the participation equation for in-house training, but negatively correlated with the 
unobservables from the probit for external training, while no significant relationships appear 
amongst the unobservables for non-white workers.
12  This uncertainty may just reflect the 
commonality of the explanatory variables used in the wage and training participation probit 
equations, with the identification resting on functional form assumptions.
13  These probit 
                                                   
12 This is not directly observed in Table 4 but can be inferred from the coefficients on the Mills’ ratio, given that 
0. and > = σ ρσ λ  
13 However, the results of testing the hypothesis that 
white non white − =θ θ are very similar if the exclusion 
restrictions amongst the industry and occupation dummies are changed and if the selection terms are generated 
from a multinomial logit model (where workers receiving both types of training were allocated to the type with 
more episodes). 
  13equations, which are reported in Appendix Table 1, show that formal schooling and general 
bour market experience  iving  ite 
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functions suggest  age benefit  f m in-house t ng are almo t t ice as high 
non-white worke hites, while h  is no differ  across ethnic g ups in the wa
effects o .  These pa te s are the sa hether train n s measured 
incidence or by the num
and whether corre for the poten ia y endogenous selection of workers into training 
s are attempte
There
to training opp was one reaso lds and Whea
(1999) for the lo
e results whether employers’ beliefs about low returns from training non-white 
employees contribute to their lower incidence of training.  The high wage benefits observed 
from in-house training for non-whites may reflect some justifiable rationing of the supply of 
this training by employers if it is more costly to train these workers.  One contributor to this 
higher cost may be labour turnover.  Transition data from the HLFS suggest that non-white 
workers in 1996 were twice as likely as white workers to not be employed in the following 
quarter, with an average of ten percent moving into either unemployment or non-participation.  
Hence, employers may respond to this higher turnover rate by directing non-white workers 
this lack of training may then contribute to future labour turnover, if firms respond to falls in 
dem
If the rationing of in-house training for non-white workers is not justified by cost 
considerations
  14extending the provision of training to groups with low incidence may be correct.  Qualitative 
questions in the ETS about factors making it hard for respondents to complete in-house 
training may be relevant to this view of inefficient rationing.  Results from these questions 
show that “lack of employer support” was listed by a significantly higher proportion of non-
white workers than white workers.  It is apparent therefore, that although the results in this 
fects of some forms of job-related 
training, m
the Acquisition of and Returns to on-the-job 
tions 22(3): 374-386. 
Blundell, 
Greenhalgh, C., and Stewart, G. (1987) “The Effects and Determinants of Training” Oxford 
Bulle
paper confirm significant ethnic differences in the wage ef
ore information is needed to determine if those differences indicate the need for 
public intervention designed to alter the access to training for minority group workers. 
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  e Training  External Training  In-hous
 White    Non-white  White    Non-white 
  X P ∂ ∂     |t|   X P ∂ ∂
 
  |t|  X P ∂ ∂
 
  |t|   X P ∂ ∂   |t| 
 
Male (=1)  -1.55  (1.02)    -0.17 (0.06)  -1.00 (0.84)    1.48 (0.87) 
Marri .62)    -2.61 (1.40)  ed (=1)  3.98  (2.55)    8.27 (2.88)  1.98 (1
Years of experience
b 1.11 (4.93)    -0.38 (0.79)  0.50 (2.79)    0.05 (0.17) 
(Yea 0)    -0.39 (0.59)  rs of experience)
2 -2.95 (5.98)    0.17 (0.15)  -1.33 (3.3
Tenure (months)  0.10  (6.64)    0.12 (4.03)  -0.02 (1.45)    0.01 (0.37) 
School years
c 1.53 (5.36)    0.51 (0.98)  1.57 (7.16)    0.66 (2.27) 
Predicted probability  0.298  0.209  0.151    0.074 
Psuedo-R 0.071 0.091  0.064    0.086 
2
Wald test (slopes = 0)  χ
2
(14) = 419.5  χ
2
(14) (14) (14)  = 102.5  χ
2  = 262.1    χ
2  = 63.8 
 
 Estimates weighted by population sampling weights and Note:  t-statistics based on heteroscedastically-
The ) of participating in training for a unit 
c Equ tional study. 
consistent standard errors. The sample size is N=6746 in the White sample and N=1483 in the non-white 
sample. Each equation also contains eight occupational dummy variables and an intercept.   
a   reported probit coefficients give the change in the probability (x100
change in each explanatory variable.  
b This is potential labour market experience calculated as age minus post-primary school years minus 12. 
ivalent full-time years of secondary school and post-secondary school educa
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